Governing Beyond the Firm: Multi‑System Strategic Leadership and the Architecture of Platform Ecosystems
- Amirhossein Marashi
- Nov 3
- 7 min read
Written By Seyed Amir Hossein Marashi Pour (Amir Marashi)
MBA Candidate, University of Technology Sydney (UTS)
Founder – Elite Sports and Business Solutions (ESBS)
📅 Published: 03 November 2025
Governing Beyond the Firm: Multi‑System Strategic Leadership and the Architecture of Platform Ecosystems
Abstract
Leaders of today’s most consequential enterprises do not manage single firms so much as they orchestrate systems: interlinked companies, platforms, consortia, investors, and regulators. Yet theory still largely assumes firm‑bounded authority. Integrating recent advances on platform power and accountability, ecosystem governance and modularity, meta‑organizations, and board/interlock networks, this article develops a model of multi‑system strategic leadership (MSL)—how leaders coordinate and control across organizational and national boundaries without full ownership. We synthesize evidence that (1) platform policies generate cross‑platform spillovers; (2) complementor products’ direct network effects shape platform owners’ governance responses; (3) modularity limits create adaptation problems that push governance toward more centralized orchestration; and (4) director and capital interlocks transmit practices and risks system‑wide. We derive testable propositions, outline a mixed‑method research design (comparative cases + network analysis + process tracing), and draw implications for board oversight and public policy in systemically important ecosystems. The framework advances leadership and governance theory beyond the firm boundary and offers a roadmap for empirical work on cross‑system control. sciencedirect.com+7journals.aom.org+7journals.aom.org+7
1. Introduction: From firm strategy to system strategy
Platform capitalism and ecosystem competition have concentrated structural power in a handful of orchestrators who set access rules, shape standards, and influence the flow of capital and data. Recent integrative reviews show platform governance is a contested arena where owners, complementors, users, and policymakers bargain over rules and rents; they also call for explicit accountability mechanisms to balance innovation with societal interests (Rahman, Karunakaran, & Cameron, 2024; Hunt et al., 2025). journals.aom.org+1
At the same time, research on externalities and complementarities in platforms demonstrates how value (and failure) emerges from cross‑actor interdependence rather than single‑firm optimization (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2024). Complementarities are often coordinated through modularity and standards; yet limits to modularity create adaptation problems that force core firms to adjust governance (Schmidt & Foss, 2025). Together these advances suggest leadership that works across organizations—multi‑system leadership—requires tools beyond equity and hierarchy. research.cbs.dk+1
We ask: How do global leaders orchestrate and sustain control across interconnected enterprises, platforms, and governance systems? We offer a parsimonious framework and a research agenda grounded in the newest, high‑credit evidence from strategy, organization theory, and finance.
2. Conceptual foundations
2.1 Platform power and accountability
Platform owners’ choices about access, algorithms, and monetization reallocate rents among stakeholders and provoke counter‑moves from complementors, users, and regulators. New reviews categorize platform power and propose accountability architectures that combine bottom‑up (collective action by low‑power actors) with top‑down (regulation, standards) mechanisms—an essential backdrop for theorizing cross‑system leadership (Rahman et al., 2024; Hunt et al., 2025). journals.aom.org+1
2.2 Ecosystems, externalities, and modularity
Ecosystem value creation hinges on orchestrating externalities and complementarities among semi‑autonomous actors; failures can be endogenous to the architecture (Jacobides et al., 2024). When modularity is limited, interoperability, customization, and availability problems emerge, reshaping the governance role of core firms (Schmidt & Foss, 2025). research.cbs.dk+1
2.3 Meta‑organizations and orchestrated systems
Meta‑organizations—organizations of organizations—operate either as meta‑level actors (representing members) or as orchestrated systems (coordinating interdependent actors). The latest systematic review clarifies these two conceptions and their governance logics—directly relevant to platforms, consortia, and standards bodies (Coulombel & Berkowitz, 2025/online‑first 2024). IDEAS/RePEc+1
2.4 Interlocks, networks, and systemic risk
Board interlocks and director network centrality diffuse practices and can amplify risk‑taking; at scale, interlocks contribute to systemic‑risk propagation through contagion and cascades. New finance evidence documents these mechanisms, raising oversight and policy stakes in ecosystem contexts (Guo et al., 2024; Amin et al., 2024). sciencedirect.com+1
3. A model of Multi‑System Strategic Leadership (MSL)
We define MSL as leadership enacted through platform rules, network positions, standard‑setting, and narratives/legitimacy, rather than solely through ownership and hierarchy. Four levers enable cross‑system control:
Property & capital structures (equity, cross‑holdings, financing pipelines) influence who bears risk and captures rents; interlocks and capital ties transmit governance logics. (Guo et al., 2024; Amin et al., 2024). sciencedirect.com+1
Platform policies & architectural choices (access, ranking, APIs, data rights) generate cross‑platform spillovers that couple outcomes across rivals (Chung, Zhou, & Ethiraj, 2024). IDEAS/RePEc
Ecosystem design & modularity determine how much coordination can be achieved by standards versus direct orchestration (Jacobides et al., 2024; Schmidt & Foss, 2025). research.cbs.dk+1
Narratives & institutional legitimacy (e.g., accountability discourses, public‑interest claims) stabilize authority amid contested power (Rahman et al., 2024; Hunt et al., 2025). journals.aom.org+1
Boundary conditions. MSL is most effective when (a) complementor interdependencies are strong; (b) modularity limits raise adaptation costs; (c) orchestrators command salient standard‑setting positions; and (d) legitimacy coalitions are credible.
4. Propositions (testable claims)
P1—Cross‑platform policy spillovers. When complementors face within‑complementor interdependencies (e.g., multi‑homing economies of scope), an access restriction on one platform will reduce activity on rival platforms (negative spillover), tightening the focal orchestrator’s control through systemic coupling (Chung et al., 2024). IDEAS/RePEc
P2—Governance under complementor direct network effects. The stronger the direct network effects of complementor products, the more likely the platform owner will deploy endorsement/curation tools (e.g., awards, featuring) to accelerate adoption while preventing complementor dominance that could challenge platform authority (Agarwal, Miller, & Ganco, 2023). Wiley Online Library
P3—Modularity limits and centralization. As interoperability, customization, and availability problems accumulate, orchestrators will centralize decision rights (e.g., stricter interface rules, approval gates) to maintain coherence and problem‑solving capacity (Schmidt & Foss, 2025). research.cbs.dk
P4—Meta‑organization form and legitimacy strategy. Orchestrators embedded in “orchestrated‑system” meta‑organizations rely more on narrative legitimacy + performance transparency (dashboards, audits), whereas “meta‑level actor” forms rely more on representational legitimacy (elected councils, balanced voting). Both logics can sustain MSL but require different accountability architectures (Coulombel & Berkowitz, 2025/online‑first 2024; Rahman et al., 2024). IDEAS/RePEc+1
P5—Interlocks as governance transmitters and risk amplifiers. Greater director network centrality and cross‑system interlocks will (a) diffuse governance practices faster (e.g., incentive designs, policy templates) but (b) increase correlated risk‑taking, raising the system’s tail‑risk exposure (Guo et al., 2024; Amin et al., 2024). sciencedirect.com+1
5. Research design and methods
To test MSL propositions, we propose a comparative multi‑case + networks design:
Settings. Global technology ecosystems linking hardware, software, cloud/AI, and finance; transnational standards consortia; and public–private programs.
Data. (1) Public filings and ownership/board data; (2) standards and policy records; (3) platform policy logs and developer documentation; (4) media/archives; (5) semi‑structured interviews with executives, complementors, investors, and regulators.
Analytic strategy.
Process tracing of pivotal policy changes and standard‑setting episodes.
Network analysis of board interlocks, capital flows, and standardization coalitions; centrality, brokerage, and contagion models to assess P5 (cf. latest evidence on interlocks and systemic risk). sciencedirect.com
Cross‑case synthesis: estimate when modularity limits (P3) and complementor effects (P2) trigger governance shifts; use event‑study logic around platform policy shocks to detect cross‑platform spillovers (P1) leveraging the rideshare natural experiment (Chung et al., 2024). IDEAS/RePEc
Measurement notes (illustrative).
Spillover index: change in rival‑platform complementor throughput following focal access policy change (Δ log activity).
Complementor direct network effects: binary/continuous indicator based on product category (e.g., multiplayer functionality); use SMJ coding scheme (Agarwal et al., 2023). Wiley Online Library
Modularity limits: expert‑coded interoperability/customization/availability incidents in interface change logs (Schmidt & Foss, 2025). research.cbs.dk
Interlock centrality & systemic risk: multi‑layer networks combining director ties and exposure measures; dependent variables include SRISK‑like metrics and tail‑risk proxies, following the latest finance designs (Guo et al., 2024; Amin et al., 2024). sciencedirect.com+1
6. Implications
6.1 For boards and investors
Boards of system‑leading firms should expand oversight from firm‑level to system‑level: require a Cross‑System Governance Report that maps (a) platform policy externalities; (b) dependence on complementors with strong direct network effects; (c) modularity hotspots; and (d) interlock‑related correlated‑risk exposures. Evidence indicates that access restrictions and interdependencies can create unintended cross‑platform consequences and amplify systemic risk—issues boards cannot see through single‑firm dashboards. IDEAS/RePEc+1
6.2 For policymakers and standard setters
Regulators should (i) require disclosure of systemically relevant platform policies (e.g., gating rules, ranking changes) and (ii) bolster meta‑organizational accountability (transparent voting/representation in standards bodies and platform councils). The newest reviews in strategy and organization point to accountability architectures that rebalance power without stifling innovation. journals.aom.org+1
6.3 For scholars
The MSL lens helps unify disparate threads—platform power, ecosystem architecture, meta‑organizations, and network finance—into a testable program. High‑resolution data on platform policy events, developer outcomes, and multi‑layer interlocks can deliver credible causal inference and move the literature beyond single‑firm strategy. journals.aom.org+1
7. Limitations and boundary conditions
Our argument is most applicable to digitally mediated ecosystems with observable policy interfaces and to global firms embedded in multi‑jurisdictional governance. Highly regulated infrastructure (e.g., utilities) may constrain MSL via ex‑ante rules; conversely, in nascent ecosystems the orchestrator’s legitimacy may be too fragile for cross‑system control. Future work should also examine federated orchestration models in which no single core firm dominates meta‑organizational steering (Coulombel & Berkowitz, 2025/online‑first 2024). IDEAS/RePEc
8. Conclusion
Multi‑system strategic leadership provides a tractable way to theorize and study how leaders coordinate across firms, platforms, and institutions. By tying platform policy spillovers (P1), complementor network effects (P2), modularity limits (P3), meta‑organizational legitimacy (P4), and interlock‑driven diffusion and risk (P5) into a single framework, this article advances governance and leadership theory for a networked economy. The stakes—for innovation, resilience, and accountability—are system‑wide. sciencedirect.com+4IDEAS/RePEc+4Wiley Online Library+4
Keywords
Strategic leadership; platform governance; ecosystems; modularity; meta‑organizations; interlocking directorates; systemic risk; accountability; standards.
References
Agarwal, S., Miller, C. D., & Ganco, M. (2023). Growing platforms within platforms: How platforms manage the adoption of complementor products in the presence of network effects. Strategic Management Journal, 44(8), 1879–1910. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3487. Wiley Online Library
Amin, A. S., Zhao, Y., Mollah, S., Kamal, S., & Simsek, R. (2024). Independent directors’ connectedness and bank risk‑taking. Journal of Financial Stability, 75, 101324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324. sciencedirect.com+1
Chung, H. D., Zhou, Y. M., & Ethiraj, S. K. (2024). Platform governance in the presence of within‑complementor interdependencies: Evidence from the rideshare industry. Management Science, 70(2), 799–814. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4706. IDEAS/RePEc
Coulombel, P., & Berkowitz, H. (2025). One name for two concepts: A systematic literature review about meta‑organizations. International Journal of Management Reviews, 27(2), 151–173. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12385. (First published online Nov 14, 2024). bam.ac.uk
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Hunt, R. A., Townsend, D. M., Simpson, J. J., Nugent, R., Stallkamp, M., & Bozdag, E. (2025). Digital battlegrounds: The power dynamics and governance of contemporary platforms. Academy of Management Annals, 19(1), (pagination TBA).* https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2022.0188. journals.aom.org+1
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2024). Externalities and complementarities in platforms and ecosystems: From structural solutions to endogenous failures. Research Policy, 53(1), 104906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2023.104906. research.cbs.dk
Rahman, H. A., Karunakaran, A., & Cameron, L. D. (2024). Taming platform power: Taking accountability into account in the management of platforms. Academy of Management Annals, 18(1), 251–294. https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2022.0090. journals.aom.org
Schmidt, J., & Foss, N. J. (2025). Modularity, adaptation problems, and the governance and problem‑solving capabilities of core firms in ecosystems. Journal of Management, 51(4), 1484–1513. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063231215023. research.cbs.dk
Kretschmer, T., Leiponen, A., Schilling, M., & Vasudeva, G. (2022). Platform ecosystems as meta‑organizations. Strategic Management Journal. (Widely cited synthesis). Wiley Online Library
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